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DISCHARGE UNDER SECTION 14
SUB. c(2) AND (3) OF THE
CHANDLER ACT

S

KNEELAND A. GODFREY*

ECTION 14 Sub. c(2) and (3)
follows:

of the Chandler Act reads as

"The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the
bankrupt has * * * (2) destroyed, multilated, falsified, concealed,
or failed to keep or preserve books of account or records, from
which his financial condition and business transactions might be
ascertained, unless the court deems such acts or failure to have
been justified under all the circumstances of the case; or
(3) obtained money or property on credit, or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by making or publishing or causing to
be made or published in any manner whatsoever, a materially
false statement in writing respecting his financial condition;
* **
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The matters embraced in the foregoing provisions have received
considerable attention by the Federal Courts, and there are numerous
authorities construing the sections involved. It would appear that the
Bar generally has not given sufficient attention to the rights afforded
both the bankrupt and the creditors and also to the duties of the bankrupt under these sections. The hazards involved to the bankrupt in
obtaining a discharge are great and the penalty to him, denial of his
discharge, may be very severe in many instances.
I.

SUB. c(2)-FAILURE TO KEEP PROPER BooKs

Both Congress and the courts have indicated a disposition towards
increasing the strictness of compelling the bankrupt to properly account
for his assets under this section of the Act. The Act originally provided
that it was necessary to establish that the bankrupt's destruction or
concealment of adequate records, or his failure to keep them, was
with "fraudulent intent to conceal the true financial condition and in
contemplation of bankruptcy."
In 1903 the Act was amended and omitted the word "fraudulent"
and also the phrase "in contemplation of bankruptcy," and in 1926 the
Act was amended to its present form to provide that books must be
kept "from which his financial condition and business transactions
might be ascertained; unless the court deems such failure to have been
justified under the circumstances of the case." It was realized that the
former provisions made it practically impossible to prevent a discharge
under this provision, in view of the fact that it was necessary to establish that the destruction of books or the failure to keep books was done
with intent to conceal and in "contemplation of bankruptcy." Both
Congress and the Courts have come more and more to realize the necessity of the keeping of proper books in any business in order that the
business might be successfully conducted. Many businesses have failed
because of inadequate bookkeeping and bankruptcy has thereby
resulted.
Under the present Act the burden of proving the intent to conceal
has been taken from the objecting creditor or the trustee, and the
burden of proving justification is placed upon the bankrupt. There is
thus indicated on the part of Congress a purpose to lodge with the
bankruptcy court a reasonably wide judicial discretion in the matter,
and the cases have indicated this wide discretion on the part of the
Bankruptcy Court. A finding by the trial court will not be upset unless
there is an absolute abuse of discretion and the finding was clearly
erroneous.
Where the creditor has shown an absolute lack of any adequate
records, the burden of satisfying the Court that the failure to produce
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them by the bankrupt was justified is on the bankrupt.2 Under subsection (c) it is necessary only that the objector show to the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which would prevent his
discharge, and then the burden of establishing otherwise is upon the
bankrupt.
The making of false entries is of course an absolute ground for
preventing the discharge of the bankrupt under this subsection. The
mere neglect to keep books, or inadvertence or mistake in keeping books
showing the bankrupt's financial condition, is under many circumstances
not sufficient grounds for the refusal of the discharge. It is of course
not necessary that the bankrupt, in every instance, keep a set of books,
and this is particularly true in the case of wage earners who are not
involved in any extensive financial transactions. It has been consistently
held that this class of bankrupts need not establish the keeping of
books in order to obtain a discharge.3 Where, however, a salaried
employee has borrowed extensively or made extensive loans to his
relatives or family, it has been held that his failure to properly record
the transactions in an adequate manner is ample grounds to prevent
the discharge.4
The failure to keep books in the case of a clergyman receiving
money from several sources and borrowing considerable sums was held
to be grounds for denial of a discharge. 5
It is generally held that the nature and not the size of the bankrupt's business or enterprise determines the necessity of keeping books
and records, and the facts in every case must be scrutinized closely in
order to determine the necessity of a bookkeeping system. The rule is
stated as follows:
"What will justify that failure depends largely upon how extensive and complicated the bankrupt's business is-a cobbler will
succeed with much less than a manufacturer-but the important
change is that since 1926 no moral obliquity need be shown.
Honesty is not enough; the law demands as the condition of a
discharge either that the bankrupt shall produce such records as
are customary to be kept by a person doing the same kind of
business, or that he shall satisfy the bankruptcy court with adequate reasons why he was not in duty bound to keep them."0
A recent case arising in this district and decided January 28, 1942,
is that of John Henry Marx, Bankrupt,7 in which the Circuit Court
2
3

White v. Schoenfeld, 117 Fed. (2d) 131 (1941).
In re Perkins, 40 Fed. Supp. 114 (D.C., NJ. 1941); In re Pinko, 94 Fed.

(2d) 259 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938).
4In re Bank, 34 Fed. Supp. 706 (D.C. N.Y. 1940).

5In re Northridge, 53 Fed. (2d) 858 (D.C. N.Y. 1931).
6 White case, note 2.
7 125 Fed. (2d) 335 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942).
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of Appeals held that Marx, a real estate broker, engaged in the general
real estate business, was not entitled to a discharge by reason of his
failure to keep books. In 1935 he was hopelessly insolvent and in 1936
he engaged in the purchase and sale of property in the name of his
daughter, and to protect himself against garnishment he began to take
bank accounts per himself as trustee or some similar designation.
He paid no regard to the source of the moneys and deposited them all
together in the same account, and actively drew on the account for
every purpose. He kept no books of any kind, and the bankrupt's
records were at variance with his own bank records and checks. He
kept no copies of income tax returns which he had filed, and the
returns of three of these years had disappeared from the assessor's
office. Under this set of facts the Referee found that the bankrupt was
not entitled to a discharge. In affirming the order based upon the
Referee's findings, the Court stated as follows:
"What books of accounts or records satisfy the requirement of
section 14c (2) are, of course, not a constant. In each case they
are a function of the nature of the particular bankrupt's business
transactions and financial condition. What would suffice in one,
would be hopelessly unsatisfactory in another. Yet, the absence
of articulated mechanics does not leave a broad area of uncertainty in which all must wander with no idea of whether they
would be entitled to a discharge if economic misfortune should
overtake them. Records or books of accounts are but the means
to an end, the ascertainment of the bankrupt's financial condition and his business transactions, and any records which meet
that end are satisfactory. They should show in some way his
loss and gains, and present a satisfactory explanation of the
receipts and disbursements. This condition precedent to discharge strikes at otherwise non-demonstrable fraud, for no
longer does the successful objecting creditor have to prove the
absence or inadequacy of the records was with intent to conceal; the bankrupt must now really have the necessary records
or explain why the circumstances of his case excuse his failure.
By no longer requiring proof of such intent, the statute has narrowed the bankrupt's road to the salutary discharge. * * * Now,
whenever a section 14c (2) objection to the discharge is raised,
the bankrupt's records must be adequate, unless excused by circumstances, or the discharge will be denied. With this considerable penalty upon inadequate books or records, perhaps the adequacy of the records kept will increase and thereby at least help
remove whatever causal relation exists between inadequate bookkeeping and bankruptcy.
"The statute lodges in the bankruptcy court a reasonably wide
judicial discretion in determining whether the failure to keep
books of account or records was justified under all the circumstances of the case, and the determination of that question will
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not be disturbed on appeal except in case of abuse of such
discretion."8
In the case of In Re Herzog,9 a set of books was kept, but transactions by a partnership and a corporation were so intermingled and
the books were in such shape that not even an auditor could ascertain
the financial condition of the bankrupt, who was interested in the
corporate and the partnership affairs. The only excuse offered by the
bankrupt was ignorance to differentiate between corporate and partnership activities. It was held that this was no excuse and that ignorance and honesty are not a sufficient justification where a bankrupt was
conducting a business as extensive as the one involved in that case.
It can readily be observed, therefore, that an attorney representing
a bankrupt must be careful to protect the bankrupt's rights by establishing either that the nature of the business did not necessitate the
keeping of books or that the books which the bankrupt kept were
adequate to determine the bankrupt's financial condition at all.times.
II. SECTION 14 SuB. c(3). FALSE STATEMENTS IN WRITING
In order to establish that a bankrupt is not entitled to a discharge
under this subsection, it is necessary to consider five essential elements,
to-wit:
(a) Statement must be in writing.
(b) It must be materially false.
(c) Bankrupt must have knowledge of the falsity.
(d) Property must be obtained or credit extended.
(e) Creditor must have relied upon the statement.
(a) Statement in Writing Regarding FinancialCondition
Statements under this section must be in writing and must involve
the financial condition of the bankrupt. The most common form of
statement is a financial statement given to a creditor for the purpose
of obtaining property or an extension of credit. The most common
form of falsity in statements is as to the concealment or overstatement of general accounts or of money borrowed, which is understated. In many cases the bankrupt will give a statement in which he
disregards family obligations, and at the time of the bankruptcy the
member of the family will then file a claim for the amount of the
indebtedness.
It is held that the issuing of bad checks does not constitute a false
statement in writing.10 A false statement means more than a mere
8 See Rosenberg v. Bloom, 99 Fed. (2d) 249 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938) ; Nix v. Stern-

berg, 38 Fed. (2d) 611 (C.C.A. 8th, 1930).
9 121 Fed. (2d) 581 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941).
10 Robinson v. Williston & Co., 266 Fed. 970 (C.C.A. 1st, 1920) ; In re Rea Bros.,
251 Fed. 431 (D.C. Mont., 1917).
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representation. Although the debt represented by the bad check is not
dischargeable, that fact in itself is not sufficient to prevent the discharge of other obligations of the bankrupt. In the case of chattel
mortgages, it has been held that a bankrupt giving a chattel mortgage
on property which he does not own is not entitled to a discharge, as
the chattel mortgage constitutes a false statement in writing,"
2
On some rather unsound reasoning it was held in In Re Hudson
that a chattel mortgage does not constitute grounds for denying the
discharge, it being stated in that case that the debt represented by the
chattel mortgage comes under a non-dischargeable debt and is not a
ground for discharge, in view of the fact that the two are inconsistent.
This case was referred to in the Powell case and the court stated that
it felt the reasoning of the Hudson case was rather unsound.
There was formerly considerable conflict in the holdings regarding
the question as to whether or not commercial reports were false statements within the Act. The question seemed to turn upon whether or
not the agency obtaining the statement actually represented the subscribing creditor at the time the statement was given by the debtor.
There can be no question, of course, that where the agency is constituted the bankrupt's agent to circulate a false statement, which the
agency obtains in making a special investigation for the subscriber,
the bankrupt would not be entitled to a discharge.'" It has, however,
been more recently held that statements given to credit companies do
constitute false statements in writing within the meaning of the Act.' 4
In the Muscara case' 5 the Court states as follows:
"The test, therefore, is whether the agency to which the false
statement was made was in fact the representative of the person
who, receiving the statement, extended credit. From the very
nature of its occupation, a mercantile agency is the representative or agent of its subscribers in the business of obtaining for
them credit ratings of persons with whom they propose to have
dealings, and when a false statement is made to such representative and is communicated to the subscriber with the result that
the subscriber relying upon it, sells property and extends credit
to one who becomes bankrupt, then the situation contemplated
by the provision arises. If the amendment of 1910 did not thus
enlarge the provision, then it did not change the law from what
the courts had interpreted it to be before the addition of the
word 'representative'."
1In re Powell, 22 Fed. (2d) 239 (D.C. Md., 1927).
Fed. 778 (D.C. Ala., 1920).
is 6 Am. Jur. 796.
'4 Weinberg v. American Shoe Co., 15 Fed. (2d) 557 (C.C.A. 5th, 1926).
12262

15 In re Muscara, 18 Fed. (2d) 606 (D.C. Pa., 1927).
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It would therefore seem that under the present Act statements
made to credit reporting companies and circulated to their subscribers
do constitute false statements in writing.
(b) Materially False Statements
Insignificant omissions of liabilities from a statement are not sufficient to constitute grounds for the denial of the discharge. The failure
to list a contingent liability, which is doubtful, has been held not to
render the statement false and it has also been held that an omission
of an equal amount of assets and liabilities does not of itself make the
statement materially false. However, the mere showing of a substantially correct balance of assets over liabilities was held not to excuse
understating both of them. 6 The question as to whether or not the
falsity is material, of course must be governed by the amount involved and the circumstances in each case. Of course, if the omission
of a liability which is contained in the statement would show the insolvency of the debtor, this would obviously be sufficient to render the
statement materially false.
(c) Knowledge of Falsity
While the Act does not provide that there must be any intent on
the part of the bankrupt, it would seem that the bankrupt must have
knowledge of the falsity of the statement, either actual or implied,
in order to bring it within this section. The rule has been stated as
follows:
"In consideration of the primary and ordinary meaning of the
word 'false' and of the general characteristic of personal misconduct that attaches to all but one of the other specified grounds
for denying a discharge, and because there is no good reason
why an incorrect statement innocently made to one creditor
should bar the discharge of the bankrupt as to all his other debts,
whatever be its effect as to the debt of that particular creditor,
the word 'false' as here employed is not merely equivalent to
'untrue' or 'incorrect,' but it connotes a guilty scienter on the
part of the bankrupt, and requires that the written statement
made for the purpose of obtaining credit shall be knowingly and
intentionally untrue in order to constitute a bar to the bankrupt's discharge. Ordinary negligence-as, for example, merely
signing as a matter of form a blank which has been filled out
incorrectly by another, under extenuating circumstances and
without any intent on the bankrupt's part to deceive-does not7
seem to be contemplated as ground for refusing a discharge."'
16 In re Maaget, 245
17

6 Am. Jur. 7934.

Fed. 804 (D.C. N.Y., 1911).
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As held in Third National Bank v. Schatten,18 the provision "false
statement in writing" implies that the statement is knowingly false or
made recklessly without the owner's belief in its truth and with
purpose to mislead or deceive. It has been held that actual knowledge of the falsity and conscious intent to deceive are not essential to denying the discharge on this ground where the bankrupt makes no effort to verify the facts and does not inquire into
omitted liabilities, and in conformity with this holding it has also
been held that the bankrupt's failure to read a statement dictated by
the manager of the creditor, where the language of the statement was
unambiguous, did not relieve the bankrupt from the falsity of the
statement. 19
It will therefore be noted that it is not necessary to establish absolute knowledge on the part of the bankrupt of the falsity of a statement, but that any reckless indifference in making the statement is
sufficient.
(d) ObtainingProperty or Extension of Credit
The fourth essential element to the denial of a discharge on this
ground is that the bankrupt must have obtained property in some form
or the extension of time to pay an existing obligation. It had been held
prior to the 1926 Amendment of the Act that the extension of credit
on a present indebtedness was within the Act, but this holding was
probably erroneous under the former provisions. The Amendment of
1926 expressly provided for the renewal of credit and the Chandler
Act so provides.
There was at one time some conflict in the authorities as to whether
or not the bankrupt who gave the false statement must be the recipient
of the property or credit, in order that the discharge be denied. These
cases usually arise out of a stockholder giving the statement to obtain
money for the corporation in which he is interested. This question was
definitely settled, however, in Levy v. Ind. Fin. Corp.,2 0 wherein the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court to the effect
that the property need not be obtained by the bankrupt, but it was
sufficient that a corporation in which the bankrupt had a substantial
interest obtained the property.
There was also some conflict in the cases as to whether or not a
surety's obligation on a bond furnished to the bankrupt is "Property"
within the meaning of the Act. It has now been definitely settled that
a surety bond was "property" within the meaning of the Act.2'
If after the false statement was given there never was a larger
amount due the creditor than at the time the statement was given and
18 81 Fed. (2d) 538 (C.C.A. 6th, 1936).
19 See In re Strauss, 4 Fed. Supp. 810 (D.C. N.Y. 1933); In re Carlton, 29 Fed.

Supp. 754 (D.C. Ohio, 1938).
U.S. 281, 72 L.Ed. 572 (1927).

20 276
21

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 78 L.Ed. 176 (1933).
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in making application for new credit, the bankrupt partially reduced
the indebtedness, such circumstances do not prevent the denial of a
discharge on this ground.
(e) Reliance by the Creditor
A concise statement on this point is contained in Remington on
Bankruptcy,22 as follows:
"The false statement must have been relied on, and if it was not
relied on in parting with the property, the discharge will not be
barred.
"But reliance may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and the
mere facts that the statement was asked for and furnished as a
basis of credit, and that the goods were supplied within a reasonable time thereafter are sufficient proof that the creditor
parted with the merchandise on the strength of the representation, in the absence of adequate rebutting evidence."
-"It is a sufficient 'reliance' if the decision to give the credit was
induced by the false statement, or that, had the truth been
stated, the credit would not have been given. If the reliance was
not upon the false statement, but rather upon the fact that
payments of preceding invoices had been made or dividends on
the stock sold had been received, it is not a sufficient reliance
to bring the case within the statute.
"It is not necessary, however, that the false written statement
shall have been the sole thing relied on, nor that the credit
shall have been obtained solely on the written statement; thus,
a discharge will be denied where the false statement was accompanied with a deposit of securities, if the credit would not have
been extended had not the statement also been given. For,
usually, there are many other things also taken into account and
relied upon in giving credit, as, for example, the health of the
applicant, his industry, etc., etc., but such other reliance is no
defense, if the statement was one of the material elements in
the extending of the credit.
"Long lapse of time between the making of the statement and
the extending of the credit naturally tends to weaken the likelihood of reliance being had upon the statement when the credit
was granted."
There is a presumption that where credit is given, the creditor
relied on the statement, this being particularly true if the credit is
extended immediately following the giving of the statement. The
burden of proof is then upon the bankrupt to establish that the credi23
tor knew the truth and could not have relied on the false statement.
Where the creditor insists upon and obtains security before extending credit, it has been held to indicate the lack of reliance on the
creditor's part, but the making of an independent investigation does
24
not establish the lack of reliance on the false statement.
22
Vol. 7, Par. 3338, 5th Edition.
2

3Widder v. Seiff, 94 Fed. (2d) 6 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).

2473 L.Ed. 593, note.

